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SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE
WORKPLACE: ARE PRIVATE
EMPLOYERS PREPARED To COMPLY
WITH DISCOVERY REQUESTS FOR
POSTS AND TWEETS?
Lisa Thomas*WITH over five hundred million active users,' Facebook is the
most visited social networking site on the Internet.2 By the
end of 2008, social networking had become more popular than
e-mail.3 Two-thirds of the world's Internet users access social networking
sites, with individuals spending, on average, ten percent of all of the time
they spend on the Internet on such sites.4 With the strong Internet pres-
ence of social networking sites, it is no surprise that companies have be-
gun to utilize the sites to interact with their customer base and clientele.
As companies begin to use social networking for business purposes, the
likelihood that such sites may contain information relevant to a lawsuit
becomes quite high.5 For companies, problems associated with the dis-
covery of electronically stored information may be directly applicable to
the discovery of information from social networking sites. As such, the
legal ramifications of the use of social networking sites as a marketing
tool, and as a means of internal and external communication, must be
addressed for companies to be prepared in the event of litigation.
This Comment addresses the problems related to the discovery of elec-
tronically stored information and how such problems relate to the discov-
* B.S. Bioengineering Rice University, 2005. J.D. Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law, 2011. Many thanks to my family and friends for their love and
encouragement throughout this endeavor. A special thanks to my husband, Tojo, for his
support during the writing and editing process. This work is dedicated to Jeremiah.
1. Facebook Press Room, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2010).
2. Top Twenty Five Social Networking Sites-Feb 2009, SOCIAL MEDIA OP-rIMIZA-
TION (Feb. 17, 2009), http://social-media-optimization.com/2009/02/top-twenty-five-social-
networking-sites-feb-2009/.
3. Adam Ostrow, Social Networking More Popular Than Email, MASHABLE (Mar. 9,
2009), http://mashable.com/2009/03/09/social-networking-more-popular-than-emaill.
4. Jerome M. Wendt, Social Networking Sites Create New eDiscovery Headaches;
Raise the Bar for eDiscovery Management and Response, DCIG (Apr. 7, 2009, 5:00 AM),
http://symantec.dciginc.com/2009/04/social-networking-sites-create.html.
5. See Daniel L. Brown & Aimee R. Kahn, Savvy Use of Social Networking Sites,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 2009, at S2.
1373
SMU LAW REVIEW
ery of information from social networking sites. Part I addresses the
history of electronic discovery, with emphasis on case law that aided the
Advisory Committee in amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
related to electronically stored information. Part II discusses the rise of
Facebook and Twitter, how such sites work, and how information can be
obtained from the sites in the event of litigation. Part III discusses cur-
rent case law relating to electronically stored information and analyzes
how courts will likely treat discovery of information from social network-
ing sites. Part IV addresses the steps that employers should take to en-
sure that they are prepared for discovery of information from social
networking sites in the event of litigation. Policy guidelines regarding the
use of social networking sites in the workplace are also considered.
I. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Electronic discovery, more recently referred to as e-discovery, is now
commonplace in litigation. The prevalence of computer usage in the
workplace has dramatically altered the universe of discoverable informa-
tion.6 As companies now maintain records in electronic form to save
space and money, evidence relevant to litigation matters will generally be
in electronic form. An early case defined electronic records to
encompass:
voice mail messages and files, back-up voice mail files, e-mail
messages and files, backup e-mail files, deleted e-mails, data files,
program files, backup and archival tapes, temporary files, system his-
tory files, web site information stored in textual, graphical or audio
format, web site log files, cache files, cookies, and other electroni-
cally-recorded information.7
This court did not intend the definition to be limited only to the terms
listed.8 Like the Kleiner court, the Advisory Committee to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure did not intend the term "electronically stored
information" to be defined in a way that did not contemplate future tech-
nological developments.9 When Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was originally adopted, it contemplated the discovery of docu-
ments and things.10 The 2006 amendment to Rule 34 explicitly included
the term "electronically stored information" and placed such documents
on the same plane as traditional paper documents." Though the term is
not specifically defined in the Federal Rules, the Advisory Committee
acknowledged that the term "electronically stored information" is in-
tended to be broad in order to cover types of electronically stored infor-
6. ADAM 1. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 1-1 (Supp. 2010).
7. Kleiner v. Bums, No. 00-2160-JWL, 2000 WL 1909470, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 22,
2000).
8. Id. at *4 n.6.
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mation currently in existence as well as types that will come into
existence in the future.12
As electronic recordkeeping and communication became more preva-
lent, courts began to see discovery requests from litigants for such infor-
mation. Even before the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 2006, courts recognized certain legal tenets regarding the
discovery of electronically stored information. First, courts acknowl-
edged that computer records, whether deleted or not, were discoverable
under Rule 34.13 In addition, courts were obligated under Rule 26(c) to
protect the parties responding to discovery requests "from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."1 4 Finally,
courts could limit discovery when the burden or expense of the discovery
outweighed the benefit of production.15 Even with these overarching
principles in mind, courts have taken different approaches to the discov-
ery of electronically stored information. Courts have been confronted
with problems relating to the scope and form of production, the accessi-
bility of the electronically stored information, and the cost of discovery.16
Luckily, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided courts some gui-
dance to help resolve these issues.
A. ZUBULAKE v. UBS WARBURG LLC
The landmark case regarding the accessibility of electronically stored
information is Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.17 Zubulake involved an
employee's claim under Title VII against her supervisor for sex discrimi-
nation and retaliation.' 8 Though UBS produced some of the e-mails re-
quested by Zubulake, the dispute stemmed from Zubulake's request for
production of e-mails that she knew had not been initially produced and
had been deleted by UBS.' 9 UBS had an e-mail backup system that
backed up the e-mails on tapes and optical discs. 2 0 To restore e-mails
from backup tapes took about five days, or with the help of a vendor, the
backup tapes could be restored faster at an increased cost.2 1 The optical
disc backups created by UBS could not be rewritten or erased and were
searchable using a language search, and UBS had kept each disc from the
time of implementation of the backup system .22
The court reconfirmed the presumption that even with electronic evi-
dence, "the responding party must bear the expense of complying with
12. Id.
13. Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. MARIAN K. RIEDY ET AL., LITIGATING WITH ELECrRONICALLY STORED INFORMA-
TION 57, 69, 77 (2007).
17. 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
18. Id. at 312.
19. Id. at 313.
20. Id. at 314.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 315.
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discovery requests." 23 Under Rule 26, the cost of production only shifts
to the party with electronic discovery requests when the cost of produc-
tion creates an "undue burden or expense" on the responding party.24
Merely because the evidence is electronic does not create an undue bur-
den or expense on the responding party.25 The court clarified that the
primary consideration as to whether production of documents would lead
to an undue burden or expense is whether the information is in an acces-
sible ("stored in a readily usable format") or inaccessible format.26 The
court considered that the e-mails Zubulake requested could be in one of
three different places with varying levels of accessibility: active user e-
mail files (accessible); e-mail archived on optical discs (accessible); and e-
mail on backup tapes (inaccessible because it required processing to be
placed in a readily usable format).27 As such, only with respect to the
backup tapes did the Zubulake court find that cost shifting could be con-
sidered. 28 In addition, the court revised the factors stated in Rowe En-
tertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.2 9 to be assessed in
determining whether the cost of discovery should be shifted to the re-
questing party.30 The seven factors included in the modified analysis are
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to dis-
cover relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources availa-
ble to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incen-
tive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.31
These factors are not of equal weight; the first two being the most im-
portant and the last being the least important. 32 The court recognized
that the analysis is fact-based and, after considering accessibility, UBS
was ordered to produce e-mails on the optical discs, active e-mail files,
and e-mails from five backup discs documenting the results, time, and
money spent. 33 After this initial assessment, the court would consider the
23. Id. at 316 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 318.
26. Id. at 318, 320.
27. Id. at 320.
28. Id.
29. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
30. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 322.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 324.
33. Id.
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cost-shifting analysis regarding e-mails on the backup discs.3 4 Ultimately,
UBS's willful deletion of e-mails and recycling of backup tapes led to the
strongest sanction-an adverse inference jury instruction. 3 5
In the fifth Zubulake opinion, Judge Scheindlin emphasized that the
implementation of a litigation hold is not the end of a party's discovery
obligations. 3 6 The court recognized the following duties of counsel with
respect to e-discovery: (1) the obligation to identify all sources of infor-
mation that could be relevant and (2) the duty to preserve the informa-
tion, produce it at the request of the responding party, and supplement
responses when counsel has knowledge that a prior response was incor-
rect.3 7 With respect to the duty of preservation, the opinion sets out four
steps for counsel to take: (1) issue a litigation hold and periodically reis-
sue it to make sure that it is not placed on the backburner, (2) communi-
cate with key employees who are likely to have relevant information and
be explicit about the duty to preserve, (3) request copies from employees
of relevant active files, and (4) ensure that relevant backup tapes are safe-
guarded.38 This opinion strongly warns counsel and their clients about
the duty to preserve relevant electronically stored information and the
penalties they both may incur for failure to do So.39
B. RULE 26(B)(2)(B)'s LIMITATIONS ON ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION
The 2006 amendment to Rule 26 followed suit with the Zubulake
court's decision. In pertinent part, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides that "[a]
party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible be-
cause of undue burden or cost." 4 0 The party from whom discovery is
sought has the burden of establishing undue burden or cost.41 After this
burden is met, the court may still order discovery of electronically stored
information if the party requesting the information shows good cause
based on a balance of the costs and benefits of discovery of the informa-
tion.42 In addition, similar factual considerations addressed by the seven
Zubulake factors are also relevant to determine whether the responding
party is required to produce information that is not reasonably accessi-
ble.4 3 The Advisory Committee's note makes it clear that if a party iden-
34. Id.
35. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
36. Id. at 432.
37. Id. at 432-33.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 441.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. "Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery re-
quest; (2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed
sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed
but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding
relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed
2010] 1377
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tifies sources of electronically stored information as not reasonably
accessible, the party's duty to preserve the evidence is not thereby re-
lieved.44 As was required by the Zubulake court, sampling of the sources
may be an option so the court can learn more about the costs involved in
obtaining the information and the burdens of production.45
C. RULE 45 AMENDMENTS
Analogous to the amendments made to Rule 26, Rule 45, regarding
production of electronically stored information from nonparties, was also
amended. The same issues regarding discovery of electronically stored
information from parties occurs with nonparties-undue burden or cost;
preservation; cost-shifting; and possession, custody, and control.46 The
amendments to Rule 45 explicitly recognized electronically stored infor-
mation could be obtained by subpoena.47 Once again, like the amend-
ments to Rule 26, the production of electronically stored information is
determined by the accessibility of the information.48 Subpoena is also
available to allow for testing and sampling to determine burden or cost
on the party responding to the subpoena.49
But a distinction between Rule 45 and Rule 26 is that the status applied
to the nonparty is different from that applied to a party-opponent.
Courts have made a distinction between nonparties and litigants and have
recognized that nonparties should not bear the same burden as litigants.50
Courts consider a number of factors to determine whether the burden to
a nonparty is undue, including "how narrowly tailored the request is, cost,
availability of the information, importance to the issues at stake, and the
benefits to the parties."5 In the factor balance, courts give nonparty sta-
tus substantial weight in determining whether a subpoena imposes an un-
due burden.52 The rationale for this factor is sound: it would be unfair for
nonparties to pay the "significant litigation costs of others."53 In addi-
tion, if courts allowed litigants to place significant costs of litigation on
nonparties, the chance that nonparties would comply with discovery re-
quests in the future would be slim. 5 4 Thus, the burden on nonparties is
crucial to consider because they may potentially be a source of invaluable
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information; (6)
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties' resources." FED.
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE ON COMMENTARY ON NONPARTY PRODUCTION &
RULE 45 SUBPOENAS 2-4 (Alan Blakely et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter SEDONA
CONFERENCE].
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee's note.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 313 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
51. Id. at 312.
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information. When a court determines that the discovery requests impose
an undue burden on a nonparty, it may order that the cost of discovery be
shifted to the requesting party.55
Similar to its Rule 34 counterpart, nonparties, like parties, must re-
spond to discovery requests with information within their "possession,
custody, or control."5 6 Courts define control in various ways, ranging
from broad expansive definitions to narrower ones. One court defined
control as "the legal right to obtain documents upon demand."57 An-
other court established that "documents are considered to be under a
party's control when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability
to obtain the documents from a nonparty to the action."58 Other courts
found that "the practical ability to obtain the documents from another,
irrespective of his legal entitlement to the documents" is controlling.59
The burden is on the requesting party to establish that the nonparty or
party has such control. 60
II. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
As courts dealt with the problems of electronically stored information
in the form of e-mail, the realm of electronically stored information be-
gan to change drastically. With the advent of social media, the ability to
communicate information also changed. Social media has been defined
as "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological
and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and
exchange of User Generated Content."6 1 Social media is an umbrella
term that encompasses both Facebook and Twitter. Because of the tre-
mendous use of Facebook and Twitter for marketing purposes, this Com-
ment will focus on these two sites in analyzing the problems with
electronic discovery that social networking sites may pose.
A. FACEBOOK
When Facebook was created by former Harvard student Mark Zuck-
erberg,62 there was no way that he could have known that what started
out as a mere hobby would turn into a worldwide phenomenon. Zuck-
erberg initially began Facebook at Harvard, where it was well received by
the students, and the project then spread to other universities. 63 The site
55. Id.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 34; SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 46, at 4.
57. United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d
1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien Biao Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
59. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
60. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d at 1452.
61. Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Chal-
lenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 Bus. HORIZONs 59, 61 (2010).





was designed to put students in contact with one another and share
photos. 6 4 Two other Harvard students, Dustin Moskovitz and Chris
Hughes, joined Zuckerberg to expand the site.65 Moskovitz and Zuck-
erberg dropped out of Harvard a few months later to run the site full-
time. 66 They changed the name of the site to Facebook and purchased
the domain name facebook.com in August 2005.67 Initially, Facebook
was available only to users with an e-mail address associated with an aca-
demic institution.68 Today, any individual who has a valid e-mail address
can join Facebook.69 Facebook is considered a social networking site that
provides people with an effective way to share information with others.70
Facebook profiles are generated after users create accounts.71 A
Facebook profile is a web page Facebook users will see if they search for
a particular person on the site. 72 Users can join networks on Facebook
based on commonalities, such as schools, employers, or cities.73
Facebook allows members of networks to see other users' profiles in the
same network.74 Users can connect with other users by sending "friend
requests."75 Unless the user adjusts his or her privacy settings, the de-
fault setting on Facebook allows anybody to view the user's profile.76
The person viewing the information does not need to have a Facebook
account and, in general, the information on a profile set to "everyone" is
public information and can be indexed by third-party search engines as
well.77 This default setting furthers the purpose of a social networking
site.78 A user can modify the privacy settings to set limits as to who can
view his or her profile.79 If "everyone" content is deleted from a user's
profile page, Facebook removes the information from the profile, but
makes no guarantees as to the use of the information outside of the site.80
On a Facebook profile, a user can upload a profile picture, view profile
pictures of Facebook friends, and modify personal information the user
has opted to share with other members.8' In addition, a user's friends are
notified if he modifies his profile or adds new friends via the mini-feed
64. Jonathan Strickland, How Facebook Works, How SrUFF WORKS (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/networks/facebook.htm.











76. Facebook's Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last
visited Aug. 15, 2010).
77. Id.
78. Strickland, supra note 64.
79. Facebook's Privacy Policy, supra note 76.
80. Id.
81. Strickland, supra note 64.
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feature. 82 Finally, the most popular portion of the profile is the wall,
where Facebook members can write messages for the user that can be
seen by others when they visit the user's profile.83 On the Facebook
homepage, a user is alerted as to the happenings in his network and is
able to leave status updates, similar to a blog posting, for his friends to
see, which may include what he is doing at that time or what he is feel-
ing.84 The user is also able to see the status updates of his Facebook
friends on his homepage.85 Though it may seem odd to publicly an-
nounce to all of a user's Facebook friends what he is doing, at least one
user is extremely happy that he did because it provided him a verifiable
alibi that placed him elsewhere at the time he allegedly committed a
crime.86
In addition to these features, Facebook allows users to post photos and
videos to the site, send instant messages to friends while they are online,
and send messages akin to e-mail.87 Businesses can create special profile
pages that are slightly different than the typical user profile page.88 Users
can become fans of the business, rather than friends of the business.89 In
addition to accessing the site on computers, users can also access
Facebook on their mobile phones.90 Due to the large number of users
and the vast amount of information on Facebook, the likelihood that in-
formation on this site may be needed during discovery is quite high.
B. TwrrrER
Another social networking site that is gaining popularity is Twitter. Biz
Stone and Jack Dorsey, co-founders of the San Francisco-based company
Obvious Corporation, founded Twitter.91 Twitter split from Obvious and
became Twitter Inc. in March 2006.9 Twitter allows users to post
messages that are sent to a network of contacts-their followers on Twit-
ter.93 It allows a user to post a single message that is distributed to all of
his friends, like a mass text message or e-mail.94 A "tweet" is a message
sent via Twitter, and users must create an account with Twitter to tweet. 95
Twitter profiles could be used as a user's blog by keeping all of the tweets





86. Vanessa Juarez, Facebook Status Update Provides Alibi, CNN (Nov. 13, 2009,10:25
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/12/facebook.alibilindex.html.











page. 96 After a user establishes a Twitter account, the user can invite
other people to join Twitter and can become followers of other users'
posts. 9 7 Tweets can only contain text-not pictures or videos-and if
users want to provide photos or videos in a tweet, they must send a link
to the webpage that hosts the content to their Twitter network. 98 Like
Facebook, Twitter can also be accessed using mobile phones. 99 Twitter
posts not only provide users or followers the ability to keep up with a
certain individual but also may form the basis of a lawsuit, as Courtney
Love was quick to find out. Courtney Love was sued for libel based on
her tweet about a fashion designer.100 A similar fate may await Facebook
users who haphazardly post to their accounts.
The privacy settings on Twitter are similar to those on Facebook.101
The default setting on Twitter is public, which means that the information
will be instantly delivered to the public.102 The user can modify the set-
tings to make information more private.103 Public tweets are also search-
able via search engines.104 Like the Facebook servers, the Twitter servers
record information when users use the service, including the IP address,
pages visited, and browser type.105
C. OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM FACEBOOK AND TWITTER
FOR LITIGATION
As the realm of electronic information expands, the realm of discovera-
ble information also expands. How can electronic information from
Facebook and Twitter be discovered for litigation purposes? It may be as
easy as a search on the Internet, if the information is available on a pro-
file with a privacy setting of "everyone" on Facebook or a public Twitter
profile. If it is not that easy to obtain the information through a basic
Internet search or search of the site, another way to obtain it is to sub-
poena the social networking site.106 Facebook has procedures in place for
the preservation and the procurement of information from the site.107
For obtaining information in civil cases, the site requires a subpoena from
California. 08 For preservation orders, Facebook recommends that the





100. Manav Tanneeru, Can the Law Keep Up with Technology?, CNN (Nov. 17, 2009,
10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/11/17/law.technology/index.html.
101. See Facebook's Privacy Policy, supra note 76.




105. Id.; see Facebook's Privacy Policy, supra note 76.
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the request can be made and processed quickly. 109 Facebook charges a
processing fee per user ID.110 There are limitations, however, that pre-
vent the site from producing content from a user's Facebook profile with-
out user consent."' The Stored Communications Act provides that "a
person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the
public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of
a communication while in electronic storage by that service." 112 The Act
does not apply to communications that are "readily accessible to the gen-
eral public."113 The Act is also broad enough to encompass social
networking sites.1 1 4 There are exceptions to the statute that allow for a
party to obtain the information without consent of the user.1 15
Likewise, Twitter has similar policies for obtaining information from
the site. Twitter has no problem releasing public information, but the
release of private information about users requires a subpoena. 116 The
subpoena can be mailed or faxed to Twitter and should include the web
address of the Twitter profile and what specific information is re-
quested. 117 Twitter conducts most communications through e-mail, and if
the request is sent from non-law enforcement officials, Twitter requires
that the communication be sent through regular support methods.118
Otherwise, Twitter lists a specific e-mail address for law enforcement offi-
cials. 119 With respect to preservation requests, the request must be ac-
companied by a subpoena or court order and sent by mail, fax, or e-
mail.120 Users generally will not lose access to Twitter when their account
is under a preservation order. 1 2 1
III. THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY TODAY
Though few cases in the United States touch on the aspects of social
networking and discovery that this Comment addresses, comparisons can
be made to case law regarding other forms of electronically stored infor-
mation, including e-mails and text messages. As social networking sites
tend to be a hybrid of these means of communication, the case law that
109. The information Facebook requests includes the party's contact information, re-
sponse due date, full name of the user, full internet address to the user's Facebook profile,
the user's date of birth , email addresses, IM names, phone numbers, address, and the
period of activity to be preserved. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
113. Id. § 2511(2)(g).
114. Andrew Zangrilli, The Stored Communication Act: New Considerations for
Webmasters, FINDLAw (June 6, 2006), http://technology.findlaw.com/articles/00006/010076.
html.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b), (c).
116. Guidelines for Law Enforcement, TWIrER, http://support.twitter.com/forums/








pertains to these areas may be relevant precedent in litigation relating to
social networking.
Just as history tends to repeat itself so, too, can cases. In a recent deci-
sion, Judge Scheindlin emphasized the principles in the Zubulake deci-
sions that she issued six years ago and defined gross negligence in the
context of discovery. 122 In Pension Committee of the University of Mon-
treal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, the plaintiffs failed to
implement timely litigation holds and were careless in their efforts to col-
lect after the duty to preserve arose.123 Before the plaintiffs filed suit, the
attorneys for the plaintiffs contacted them to begin preserving docu-
ments.124 The issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs' conduct mer-
ited the imposition of sanctions for the spoliation of evidence.125
In deciding the case, Judge Scheindlin clarified four concepts which are
applicable to all forms of electronically stored information:
[T]he plaintiffs' level of culpability. . . the interplay between the duty
to preserve evidence and the spoliation of evidence . . . which party
should bear the burden of proving that evidence has been lost or
destroyed and the consequences resulting from that loss ... [and] the
appropriate remedy for the harm caused by the spoliation.126
Regarding the level of culpability in the discovery context, Judge
Scheindlin found that a failure to preserve evidence that causes evidence
to be lost or destroyed is at least negligent and may be gross or willful
depending on the particular circumstances of the case.127 As previously
mentioned in her fifth Zubulake decision, "the failure to issue a written
litigation hold constitutes gross negligence because that failure is likely to
result in the destruction of relevant information."1 2 8 Depending on the
circumstances of the particular case, the failure to take appropriate mea-
sures with electronically stored information is at least negligent.129 Ex-
amples of gross negligence include failing to collect records from key
players, destroying e-mail or backup tapes after the duty to preserve has
taken effect, and failing to collect information from the files of former
employees still in the possession, custody, or control of the company after
the duty to preserve has arisen. 30 In considering the duty to preserve
and spoliation, the imposition of sanctions results from the court's duty to
prevent abuse of the judicial process.131 The duty to preserve arises when
parties reasonably anticipate litigation, and when that duty arises, the
parties have a responsibility to pause their normal document-retention-
122. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685
F. Supp. 2d 456, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
123. Id. at 476.
124. Id. at 473.
125. Id. at 463.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 465.
129. Id. at 464.
130. Id. at 465.
131. Id. at 466.
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and-destruction policies and put in place a litigation hold so that relevant
evidence is not destroyed. 132 Spoliation occurs when evidence is not pre-
served or is altered, affecting its evidentiary value.133
With regard to burden of proof, the question is who should bear the
burden of establishing the importance of information that can no longer
be found due to spoliation.134 When the sanctions requested are fines or
cost shifting, the court considers the conduct of the party that failed to
preserve the evidence and the resulting prejudice that failure may have
caused the other party.135 If more severe sanctions are requested, such as
an adverse inference instruction, the court must consider in addition to
the conduct of the party causing spoliation, whether the evidence lost was
relevant and, as such, caused prejudice to the opposing party.136 Rele-
vance in this context requires the party requesting severe sanctions to
establish that the evidence would have aided in establishing its claims or
defenses, which is a higher standard than mere relevance.13 7 There is a
rebuttable presumption of relevance and prejudice when a party acts in
bad faith or is grossly negligent. 38 In the context of negligence, the inno-
cent party has the burden to establish relevance of the destroyed evi-
dence and prejudice to the innocent party as a result. 139 Judge Scheindlin
employed the following test for the shifting of the burden:
When the spoliating party's conduct is sufficiently egregious to jus-
tify a court's imposition of a presumption of relevance and prejudice,
or when the spoliating party's conduct warrants permitting the jury to
make such a presumption, the burden then shifts to the spoliating
party to rebut that presumption . . . . If the spoliating party demon-
strates to a court's satisfaction that there could not have been any
prejudice to the innocent party, then no jury instruction will be war-
ranted, although a lesser sanction might still be required.140
Finally, with respect to the remedy, the court acknowledged that it has
broad discretion in determining sanctions.141 The types of sanctions
available to the court are "further discovery, cost-shifting, fines, special
jury instructions, preclusion, and the entry of default judgment or dismis-
sal." 142 The court should generally impose the sanction that is the least
harsh but still affords an adequate remedy. 143
Another general consideration with respect to production of electroni-
cally stored information is the language of Rule 34, providing that a party
132. Id.
133. Id. at 465.
134. Id. at 466.




139. Id. at 467-68.
140. Id. at 468-69.





may request production of electronically stored information "in the re-
sponding party's possession, custody, or control." 1 " Rule 34 can only be
used against parties to an action. 1 4 5 Control exists when "a party has a
legal right to obtain documents," and may be established if a principal-
agent relationship exists or if a contract establishes that right.14 6 A re-
questing party is generally not allowed to search for data in the posses-
sion of a nonparty unless that party can show that the materials requested
were in the possession or are currently in possession of the party to whom
the discovery request was made. 1 4 7 With these general principles in
mind, this Comment will now turn to specific decisions regarding particu-
lar types of electronically stored information.
A. E-MAIL
Courts take different approaches with production of party e-mails and
nonparty e-mails. In a Title VII case out of New York, the defendants,
former employers of a plaintiff, requested production of e-mails from the
plaintiff's America Online account. 1 4 8 The plaintiff contended that her
supervisor and the chief financial officer of the company made unwel-
come sexual advances and that she was fired in retaliation for reporting
the conduct.149 After the employee's attorney contacted the employer by
letter, the employer hacked into her America Online e-mail account,
which was established before her employment but paid for by the em-
ployer during her employment, and forwarded approximately four hun-
dred e-mails from her account to the employer's e-mail.15 0  The
defendants requested production of every e-mail from the employee's
America Online e-mail account during the time period the employer was
paying for the account and also requested the e-mails that were relevant
to her claims of sexual harassment and emotional distress.15 The reason
the employer paid for the account was because it served as a backup e-
mail system when the plaintiff's company e-mail account did not work.15 2
The plaintiff also included in her complaint a hacking claim, and the de-
fendants contended that the e-mails that were not intercepted by the em-
ployer were relevant to establish the employer's ownership of the account
for the purposes of that claim and also her claims of emotional distress.'53
The court found that these reasons were not justifications for the produc-
tion of all of the plaintiff's e-mails, as she had already produced all e-
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
145. Id.
146. Rosie D. v. Romney, 256 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D. Mass. 2003).
147. Mintel Int'l Grp., Ltd. v. Neergheen, 636 F. Supp. 2d 677, 694 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
148. Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK) (JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id. at *2-3.
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mails relating to her claim for emotional distress.154 The court astutely
noted that production of the e-mail account to this extent would be a
requirement for "the production of every thought she may have reduced
to writing or, indeed, the deposition of everyone she might have talked
to."i15
Likewise, in Mackelprang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada,
an employee sued her employer for sexual harassment based on violation
of Title VII.156 The issue in the case concerned a defendant's motion to
compel production of e-mails from the plaintiff's two MySpace ac-
counts.'57 After a defendant discovered what it believed to be the plain-
tiff's accounts, it subpoenaed MySpace to obtain information from the
accounts, including private e-mail communications. 5 8 In response, MyS-
pace only provided public information from the accounts and refused to
produce any private e-mail communications absent a search warrant or
consent from the plaintiff.15 9 The defendant attempted to gain the plain-
tiff's consent for production of the e-mail messages from MySpace, but
the plaintiff refused on the grounds of invasion of privacy and irrele-
vance.1 6 0 The court denied the defendant's motion to compel and stated
that "[t]he proper method for obtaining such information, however, is to
serve upon [p]laintiff properly limited requests for production of relevant
email communications."161 The court did not preclude further discovery
by the defendant to determine whether the MySpace accounts were actu-
ally the plaintiff's.16 2 But, the court did emphasize that if the plaintiff
failed to produce relevant e-mails from her MySpace accounts, after a
determination that they were her accounts, she could be subject to sanc-
tions for such conduct.16 3
As mentioned previously,164 there are limitations on the ability of
third-party providers to respond to subpoenas for information from their
sites. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC reiterates the limita-
tions placed on the ability of internet service providers to disclose infor-
mation of their subscribers.16 5 The case surrounded a lawsuit regarding
claims made by a party after Hurricane Katrina.166 State Farm, the de-
fendant, subpoenaed America Online, requesting production of e-mails
from a nonparty witness's account.167 State Farm also requested any and
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id.
156. Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat'1 Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-
GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
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all documents, for a six-week period of time, from the witness's e-mail
address or account.168 After State Farm's refusal to withdraw the sub-
poena, the witness moved to quash the subpoena because it violated the
Privacy Act, was overbroad, and required production of privileged e-
mails. 169
With respect to the privacy claims, the court found that America On-
line could not provide the contents of the witness's emails to State Farm
because there is no exception for the disclosure of such communications
pursuant to civil discovery subpoenas in the Privacy Act.170 The court
made it clear "that 'unauthorized private parties' and governmental enti-
ties are prohibited from using Rule 45 civil discovery subpoenas to cir-
cumvent the Privacy Act's protections."171 On the issue of whether the
subpoena imposed an undue burden on the witnesses by being too broad,
the court found that the request of all of the witness's e-mails for a six-
week period was too broad because there was no limit on the e-mails'
relevance to the suit.17 2 Because the parties requested e-mails over a six-
week period, the subpoena placed an undue burden on the witness be-
cause the e-mails produced may likely include personal and privileged
information unrelated to the suit.173 Thus, production of electronically
stored information from third-party providers has certain limits that even
a Rule 45 subpoena cannot overcome. Though there are limits, a party
may be required to produce electronically stored information relevant to
the suit from third-party providers and be subject to sanctions for a fail-
ure to do so.174
B. TEXT MESSAGING
As Twitter is based on technology similar to text messaging,175 case law
relating to the discovery of text messages may be applicable. Whether
text messages are discoverable or whether obtaining such information
from a third-party provider would violate the privacy interests of the user
is generally an issue with such forms of communication.17 6 The Ninth
Circuit decided whether employees had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to text messages transmitted via a two-way pager in
Quon v. Arch Wireless.'77 Though the case involved public employ-
ment, 78 the same principles could be applied in the context of private
168. Id.
169. Id. at 608-09.
170. Id. at 611.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 612.
173. Id.
174. See Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-
GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
175. Strickland, supra note 91.
176. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub
nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (U.S. 2010); Flagg v. City of Detroit,
252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
177. Quon, 529 F.3d at 895.
178. Id.
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employment. Arch Wireless had a contract with the City of Ontario to
provide text-messaging services and to the City, which two of the plain-
tiffs received.179 The City had no policy in place regarding text messaging
but had a general policy regarding computer usage applicable to all em-
ployees. 180 The policy specifically limited the computer usage to City re-
lated business and stated that use of the equipment for personal benefit
violated the policy. 181 The policy also stated that "[u]sers should have no
expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources."1 82
Plaintiffs signed an employee acknowledgement indicating that they had
read the computer policy, and a few years later, one of the plaintiffs at-
tended a meeting where he was informed that the pager messages would
be considered e-mail and that the policy applied to them too.1 83 The City
did not have a formal policy with respect to the pagers, but per the terms
of its contract with Arch Wireless, the City was assessed overage charges
whenever a user went over 25,000 characters in a month. 184 A com-
mander with the police department's administration bureau was in charge
of collecting the overage fees from employees when they went over their
limit and had a policy of not reviewing the messages when the employee
paid the overages.185 When officers exceeded their limit multiple times,
the commander was ordered to get transcripts of the text messages from
the provider to audit whether they were business-related messages or
personal ones and to determine if the character limit on the pagers should
be increased.186 The City got the messages from Arch Wireless, after
Arch Wireless verified that the numbers corresponded to the pagers that
belonged to the City.' 8 7 Upon review of the transcripts, the City found
that one of the plaintiffs had exceeded his limit because he was sending
personal sexually explicit messages to other plaintiffs.188 The police of-
ficers brought suit claiming that the disclosure of the text messages vio-
lated the Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment.189
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the users of the services had a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the messages stored by
Arch Wireless due to the informal policy of the official in charge of col-
lecting the overage charges.190 The court also found that Arch Wireless
violated the Stored Communications Act by providing the messages to
the City.191 The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect
in concluding that the department's search of Quon's text messages was
179. Id.
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unreasonable.19 2 The Court explicitly failed to delineate precise guide-
lines as to an employee's expectation of privacy when utilizing employer-
provided communication devices.193 The Court also emphasized that an
employer's policy regarding communications on employer-provided com-
munication devices will shape an employee's reasonable expectations of
privacy regarding such communications, particularly if the policy is
clear.194 This case may provide guidance to private employers as to what
degree the informal representations of employees can undermine a for-
mal policy in place at a company. 95 It appears that the representations
of an employee with the authority or delegated authority to enforce the
policies of a company may be sufficient to override the stated policy of
the employer, particularly when the policy is not clearly communi-
cated.196 A company that has a detailed written policy in place that is not
enforced is no better off than a company that has no formal policy in
place.
A recent case out of the Eastern District of Michigan also highlights
the discovery issues with text messaging. In Flagg v. City of Detroit, the
defendants tried to prevent discovery of text messages sent by city-issued
text messaging devices.197 The City of Detroit entered into a contract
with a third-party (nonparty) provider for text messaging services to city
officials and employees.198 The City terminated its contract with the
third-party provider, but the provider continued to maintain some
records of the messages that were sent during the period of the con-
tract.199 The plaintiff requested from the third-party provider production
of "text messages sent or received by 34 named individuals, including the
individual Defendants, during a number of time periods spanning over 5
years, and ... sent or received by any City official or employee during a
four-hour time period in the early morning hours of April 30, 2003."200
In opposition to the subpoena, the defendants argued that the produc-
tion of the text messages would violate the Stored Communications Act,
which prohibited the production of text messages in the possession of a
third party for civil discovery purposes.201 Though the plaintiff tried to
obtain the information by means of a Rule 45 subpoena, the court clari-
fied that the same information could have been obtained via a Rule 34
subpoena and proceeded under that assumption.202 The court made the
192. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2630.
195. Philip L. Gordon, Supreme Court Review of Quon May Provide Important Gui-
dance for Private Employers, WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNSEL (Dec. 14, 2009, 2:42 PM),
http://privacyblog.1ittler.com/2009/12/articles/electronic-monitoring/supreme-court-review-
of-quon-may-provide-important-guidance-for-private-employers/.
196. See City of Ontario, 130 S. Ct. at 2629-30.
197. 252 F.R.D. 346, 347 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 347-48.
200. Id. at 348.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 358.
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distinction between a customer of the third party and a party outside of
the relationship and determined that the information could be obtained
under Rule 34 but did not answer the question as to whether the informa-
tion could be obtained under a Rule 45 subpoena without a violation of
the Stored Communications Act.2 0 3 Also important to the court was the
fact that the city employees were informed that the sent messages should
be considered public information, property of the City, and not private in
nature.204 These factors indicated that the employees gave their implied
consent for production of the archived messages from the third- party
provider. 205 As such, the court ordered plaintiffs to prepare a Rule 34
request for production so that the defendants could have the information
produced from the third-party provider.206 Thus, the text messages were
discoverable under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In a case from the Northern District of California, the court ordered a
plaintiff to produce her Sidekick mobile phone. 207 The case concerned
claims by the plaintiffs regarding a denial of overtime pay by the defen-
dant.208 The plaintiff in question owned a business in addition to working
for the defendant, and the Sidekick was paid for by the other business.209
The defendant requested production of communications and documents
from the Sidekick, claiming that a denial of overtime relates to how the
plaintiff spent her time when working for the defendant. 210 The court
ordered the plaintiff to produce communications and documents relating
to her work for her other business during the dates and times she worked
for the defendant. 211 Thus, these communications could have included
text messages from her Sidekick. 212
C. SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
In 2009, the United States District Court in Colorado denied a motion
for protective orders by plaintiffs when the defendant Wal-Mart sent sub-
poenas to social networking sites seeking information about the plaintiffs
in a lawsuit related to injuries they sustained while working at Wal-
Mart. 213 The plaintiffs claimed that the information sought fell within
patient-physician privilege and spousal privilege. 214 The court found that
the information sought by the subpoenas was "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as is relevant to the issues in
203. Id. at 366.
204. Id. 364-65.
205. Id. 365.
206. Id. at 366.
207. Ho v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. C05-04867 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 2756365, at *1
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1067018, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009).
214. Id. at *1.
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this case" and denied the protective order.215 The question here was how
can information posted on a social networking site be considered privi-
leged after disclosure of the information to individuals able to view the
plaintiffs' profiles?
Though there is little U.S. case law relating specifically to discovery
issues and social networking sites, a recent Canadian case is worth men-
tioning. The plaintiff John Leduc was involved in a car accident with the
defendant.216 The plaintiff claimed a loss of enjoyment of life as a result
of the negligent driving of the defendant. 217 Though Facebook did not
come up at the discovery conference, it did come up during an evaluation
by a psychiatrist for the defense.218 Upon finding out that the plaintiff
had many friends on Facebook, defendant's counsel searched the plain-
tiff's Facebook profile but found that only his Facebook friends could
view the plaintiff's profile. 219 The defendant requested an order to pre-
serve and produce all information on the plaintiff's profile.220 The lower
court found that the Facebook profile was a document and that it was
within the control of the plaintiff.2 2 1 However, the lower court did not
require the plaintiff to produce his Facebook page because the defendant
did not meet his burden of establishing that the plaintiff had relevant
information on his page.2 2 2
Similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ontario Rules of
Civil Procedure require a party to produce "'every document relating to
any matter in issue in an action that is or has been in the possession,
control or power of a party' and to produce each such document unless
privilege is claimed over it."223 In determining whether the lower court
was correct in its determination, the court considered how other courts in
Canada have approached the production of Facebook profiles. 2 2 4 The
court made distinctions between two types of Facebook profiles-public
and private. 225 A user can have both a private and a public profile, and
the court allowed the inference to be made that information on the public
profile is also likely to be found on the private profile.226 With respect to
users that only have a private profile, the court stated that based on the
social networking purpose behind the site, it can be inferred that users
intend to make personal information available to other people on the
site. 2 2 7 The court made it clear that a user with a private profile stands on
215. Id. at *2.
216. Leduc v. Roman (2009), 308 D.L.R. 4th 353, para. 2 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
217. Id.
218. Id. para. 3.
219. Id. para. 5.
220. Id. para. 6.
221. Id. para. 8.
222. Id. para. 9.
223. Id. para. 12 (quoting Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r.
30.0(1), (2)).
224. Id. paras. 23-24.
225. Id. para. 26.
226. Id. para. 29.
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equal footing as a user with a public profile.228 The court mentioned that
based on Facebook's Terms of Use, it is clear that the profile is within the
user's control because he can add or delete content from his profile, and
the party still has the obligation to produce information from his
Facebook page relevant to the suit.2 2 9 But the mere existence of a profile
does not mandate the production of the contents of that page.230 The
court found that the defendant should have been able to question the
plaintiff to determine what relevant information was posted on the site
and ordered this to occur.231 The court stated it best:
To permit a party claiming very substantial damages for loss of en-
joyment of life to hide behind self-set privacy controls on a website,
the primary purpose of which is to enable people to share informa-
tion about how they lead their social lives, risks depriving the oppo-
site party of access to material that may be relevant to ensuring a fair
trial.232
The court also set out a procedure to follow with respect to the discov-
ery of Facebook profiles.233 When a party discovers the opposing party's
Facebook profile, the following steps should be taken to ensure that the
party discovering the profile has the opportunity to determine whether
the site contains information relevant to the suit.2 3 4 Specifically, the user
should be required to preserve and maintain printouts of the materials
posted on his site, produce that to the opposing party, and when few doc-
uments are produced, allow the opposing party to cross-examine the user
to find out if there is relevant content on the site.2 3 5
Thus, it appears that privacy controls had limited utility in preventing
the exposure of a party's Facebook profile in litigation.236 Though a
party requesting the information still has the burden of establishing that
the information is relevant before a court will order production, the per-
missible inferences the Canadian court allowed regarding content of the
site when a user has both a public and a private profile essentially would
allow the content of the site to be produced in most cases. 237 Unless a
user is particularly cautious, it is rare that the pictures available on a pub-
lic profile will not in some way be relevant to a lawsuit, particularly when
a user claims damages for a loss of enjoyment of life.
228. Id. para. 32.
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D. ARE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES DISCOVERABLE?
The case law regarding e-mail and text messaging could be equally ap-
plicable to the use of Facebook accounts with privacy settings in place in
the private employment context. If there is a question as to whether the
information on a social networking site may be discoverable, by analogy
to third-party providers of e-mails and text messaging, it appears that the
information on such sites would be discoverable in civil litigation.
Though a private employer does not pay for access to a Facebook ac-
count, the account is hosted by a third party and could be used for both
business and personal use.2 3 8 Thus, applying the principles from Rozell v.
Ross-Holst, a judge would have discretion to limit production of the in-
formation posted to a Facebook account to the extent of the parties' ini-
tial disclosures. 239 The use of a social networking site at work thus would
not give the defendants or plaintiffs free reign to discover anything and
everything posted on the site when privacy controls are in place on the
account.240 Allowing discovery of a Facebook profile just because a party
has an account would create the situation where counsel would just be
fishing for information on the site without any basis.241 Moreover, con-
sidering the networks and numerous friends that a person has on the site,
it is economically unfeasible to require production of every posting, e-
mail, or conversation on the site for an extended period of time because
sorting through the information would take too much time to justify the
value of the information. It is for this very reason that a request for pro-
duction from such social networking sites may be used strategically
against a party to drive up the cost of discovery and push the case toward
settlement.242 Also, because companies likely have not encountered nu-
merous requests for production regarding the sites and are unfamiliar
with them, it is likely that such requests can be used to distract the party
from the real issues of the case, in addition to driving up the costs of
discovery.243
If a party to a suit has a Facebook account or a Twitter account, a court
would likely find that such an account is in the possession, custody, or
control of the party, and as such, a party would need to produce relevant
information from the site under Rule 34 based on the user agreements in
place with Facebook and Twitter. 244 An additional concern is the ability
to procure the information for discovery purposes. A recent virtual
238. See generally Kate Dickman, Facebook-Mixing Personal with Business, COM-
MUNIKATE (Aug. 8, 2008), http://katedickman.com/2008/08/08/facebook-mixing-personal-
with-business/.
239. See No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK) (JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 20,
2006).
240. See id.
241. See Leduc v. Roman (2009), 308 D.L.R. 4th 353, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
242. e-Discovery Virtual Roundtable: Email & Web 2.0, SYMANTEC (Apr. 2, 2009), http:/
/www.symantec.com/podcasts/detail.jsp?podid=b-ediscovery-virtual-roundtable_web2.0
(discussing e-Discovery issues and best practices).
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roundtable by Symantec addressed the problems with obtaining a record
of the information from Facebook or Twitter in a useable, understandable
format.245 When users view their profile page on Facebook, it appears to
them to be a consolidated page with all information in one place. 2 4 6
However, when such user content is archived, information is located in
different databases and does not appear in the same format as it appears
on a Facebook page. 2 4 7 Thus, to pull all the information together and
decipher how a page appeared takes more time than if the information on
a page at any given time were stored as a discrete package of information,
like a word document or an e-mail.248 This will likely create the biggest
e-discovery hassle with respect to compliance with discovery requests.
Another consideration is the Stored Communications Act and the de-
gree that the Act may affect the ability of a party to a suit to obtain
information from a third-party provider.249 It appears that Rule 45 sub-
poenas issued to third-party providers have limitations that Rule 34 re-
quests for production can overcome.250 Thus, in the initial interrogatories
stage, a party should question whether relevant information is present on
a Facebook or Twitter page and request that the opposing party produce
the information under Rule 34. By going through the party itself to ob-
tain the information, the issues with consent and the Stored Communica-
tions Act may be avoided if the information is from the party's own
profiles. 251
IV. SOCIAL NETWORKING AND THE WORKPLACE
Considering the problems that may arise with the use of social
networking in the workplace, private employers and their counsel must
consider the benefits and the costs associated with the use of such sites in
the workplace. Twitter and Facebook market to employers that they can
use the sites to connect with their clients or consumers.252 But the legal
implications of the use of such sites and the need to preserve the sites in
the anticipation of litigation may lead to headaches for employers, their
IT groups, and their counsel. 253 As such, employers who decide to use
social networking sites for marketing purposes, for internal communica-
tions, or for communications with their clients need to take steps to en-
sure that if the information is ever needed for discovery, they are well-
prepared.
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The first decision to be made by employers is whether to allow their
employees the use of social networking during business hours while at
work. The use of social networking in the workplace may be beneficial
but may also be problematic due to a loss of productivity in the work-
place, the potential for theft of data, liability for the contents of the sites
in lawsuits, and damage to the employer's image. 2 5 4 Due to these risks,
many companies have banned the use of Facebook and Twitter in the
workplace, including certain investment banks and law firms.2 5 5 Some
employers that do not completely ban the use of Facebook have taken a
middle-ground approach to the posting of information on the site. 2 5 6 For
example, ESPN prohibits its employees from posting onto Facebook or
Twitter any content related to sports without its permission.2 5 7 The Asso-
ciated Press takes an even stronger approach and requires its employees
to monitor what they and their friends say on Facebook, and to delete
certain posts on their Facebook pages. 2 5 8 Assuming that employers allow
social networking in the workplace, certain steps can be taken to mini-
mize their risk, both with respect to the company's fan page and the em-
ployees' personal profiles.
A. COMPANY FAN PAGES
The creation of a company fan page may seem like an easy task, but the
employer must consider whether the page can be archived or preserved in
anticipation of litigation and who has access to the page to act as its ad-
ministrator. The first issue to consider in creating a company's Facebook
page or Twitter account is who is responsible for maintaining and moni-
toring the site. It has been suggested that a separate e-mail account
should be created for all social networking site endeavors and account
information should be available to all "stakeholders." 2 5 9 It is important
that the company's Facebook page is viewed as a company-controlled
page, rather than any kind of individual asset.260 As such, the company
should limit who posts on these sites as the face of the company. In addi-
tion, the individuals in charge of the page should monitor the postings
and comments.
An additional consideration regarding who should have access to the
page is how to limit access once the employee is terminated or leaves
employment. 2 6 1 Suppose that an employee in charge of postings on a
company's social networking page is fired.2 6 2 Assuming that person is the
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administrator of the company's Facebook page, that employee could still
maintain access despite the fact that he is no longer with the company.263
Because the individual could post to the page and damage the company's
reputation, there must be a limit in place to prevent such an occur-
rence.264 One source suggests that a company can create a profile page
akin to a personal profile page.2 6 5 Once that page is created, a page for
the company can be created and additional administrators to the page can
be added.266 These administrators can be readily changed so that when
an employee who was in charge of the page leaves the company, he can
be deleted as an administrator. 267 Thus, when a company page is created,
an employer must decide who will administer the social media sites and
transmit information from the company to the public and ensure that
upon termination, the ability of the terminated employee to access the
sites as an administrator is prevented.
In addition, employees in charge of the site should have clear guide-
lines as to what can and cannot be posted on the company's Facebook
page. Also, it should be clear that the monitoring of social media and
postings on such sites are within the scope of employment of the individ-
ual and subject to any limitations and restrictions that the company im-
poses on such postings. There should be an approval process in place
before a posting is made so that upper management in marketing has
some oversight in the process. By doing so, the employer maintains a
level of control over the postings such that it will be accountable for the
content. Because the page should be viewed as a company-controlled as-
set, it is likely that a court would find that the site is within the company's
"possession, custody, or control" and as such, information pertinent to
suit must be disclosed to the opposing party and produced by the party in
custody of the material.268 As mentioned previously, there are many
problems with the way that social networking sites are archived that
could lead to problems in obtaining the information.269
There are a few steps that employers can take to make sure that they
do not suffer spoliation sanctions for destruction of information relevant
to suit on their social networking pages. First, if a company has a reason-
able anticipation of litigation, it should issue a litigation hold and a pres-
ervation order and contact Facebook and Twitter to make sure they are
aware of the preservation order. The preservation order should be spe-
cific, relate to the company page for a set period of time, and advise ad-
ministrators not to delete the postings from the page. In addition to
contacting Facebook and Twitter, the administrators of the site for the
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as posters and administrators have not deleted postings on a company's
page, older posts can be seen with mere clicks on the company page.270
But, Facebook does not guarantee that such information will always be
available by this method.271 With Twitter, however, there is approxi-
mately a one-and-a half-week window in which the tweets can be re-
trieved by searching for them using the search engine on Twitter, though
they never disappear from a user's Twitter stream. 272 Thus, once again,
with a litigation hold, the administrators of a Twitter site should not de-
lete content from the Twitter page during the relevant time period to
avoid the extra step of having to retrieve the information from Twitter
itself.
Companies that want to be extra cautious with their Facebook or Twit-
ter pages may want to archive the pages themselves and save them lo-
cally. There are programs in circulation for archiving tweets that a
company's IT department would be able to implement successfully, but
this is a task for IT to undertake. 273 The same archiving possibility may
exist for Facebook as well,2 7 4 and it is a good idea for IT to consider
whether locally archiving a company's Facebook page would be a viable
option. But once again, a company's IT group should formulate the pol-
icy regarding the archiving of such sites after discussion with upper man-
agement and counsel.
B. EMPLOYEE-SPECIFIC SOCIAL NETWORKING PAGES
A harder aspect to address is whether a company should permit em-
ployees to use social networking sites for business purposes, including
communications with clients and internal communications with cowork-
ers. If employers allow access to social networking sites or employees
circumvent controls that limit their access, employees may be using the
sites to conduct the business of their employers or collaborate with col-
leagues. As such, the information that relates to the employment of the
individual may be relevant to a potential suit. The policy that an em-
ployer takes with respect to the use of social networking must be specific
and detailed but at the same time, cannot be so constraining that the pur-
pose for using the sites to reach clients, consumers, and colleagues is
defeated.
IBM has taken the reigns and developed guidelines specific to social
270. FRANK MCCOWN & MICHAEL L. NELSON, What Happens When Facebook is
Gone?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ACM/IEEE-CS JoINT CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL
LIBRARIES 251, 252 (2009), http://www.cs.odu.edu/-mln/pubs/jcdl09/archiving-facebook-
jcdl2009.pdf.
271. Id.
272. Sarah Perez, 10 Ways to Archive Your Tweets, READWRITEWEB (Aug. 11, 2009
6:48 AM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/10_ways-to-archive-your-tweets.php.
273. There are many options for people who want to archive their tweets or other user's
tweets that may be good for preservation purposes. See id.
274. See McCowN & NELSON, supra note 270, at 252-54.
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computing.275 The company places some responsibility on its employees
for monitoring what is said on social networking sites and reporting con-
duct that strays from its guidelines. 276 This would be an important part of
any policy relating to social networking to ensure that the policy has an
enforcement mechanism. Particularly unique to IBM's policy is the re-
quirement that when employees discuss matters related to the company,
employees have to identify themselves by name and their role at the com-
pany and make it clear that they are speaking for themselves and not on
behalf of the company.277 In addition to this, the company requires em-
ployees who post to blogs to use a disclaimer that the views posted do not
represent the company's views.278 The guidelines require employees to
be thoughtful with respect to dispersing internal, confidential communi-
cations externally via social networking sites.279 Also, the employee may
not comment on the business performance of the company or affirm or
deny rumors related to the company's business performance. 280 The
company makes users personally responsible for the information that is
posted on these sites and emphasizes that employees cannot alter previ-
ous posts without making it clear that the post has been altered.281 The
policy also requires employees to be respectful with their postings and
gently reminds employees not to let their social networking activities in-
terfere with their work-related commitments and duties.282
In addition to the IBM guidelines, there are a few additional steps that
employers can take with respect to an employee's use of social network-
ing in the workplace that may avoid the problems associated with ob-
taining the information for litigation purposes and maintain a company's
reputation on social networking sites. First, like IBM has done, compa-
nies should make sure that they create a social networking policy that is
specific and that employees are educated about the policy and the reper-
cussions in the case of violations of the policy. The policy should also be
enforced. An umbrella computer usage policy may not be sufficient to
encompass the specific concerns related to social networking, especially if
social networking is not mentioned. With respect to enforcement, the
company should be consistent and actually follow its own policy guide-
lines for the policy to have any meaning.283
In contrast to a general e-mail policy that usually advises employees
that their business e-mail communications should not be considered pri-
vate, social networking sites are usually not viewed in this way because
they are personal accounts. A step that employers could take is to re-
275. IBM Social Computing Guidelines, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/blogs/zzlen/guide-
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quire employees who would like to use social networking for business
purposes to create a separate business account, based on their business e-
mail address, as a condition to use the sites in the workplace and on the
employer's equipment, including mobile phones, desktops, and laptops.
In addition, the company could require that the employee link to the
company's fan page or website on his own business page. The employees
should also be made aware that the information they post on social
networking sites, their e-mails, and conversations may be discoverable.
The employer should formulate a written agreement stating that in ex-
change for the employee's access and use of social networking in the
workplace, the employee will grant consent for the disclosure of the in-
formation from his business profile page, including e-mail, posts, notes,
and all features of Facebook or Twitter used for communication purposes,
in the event the information is needed for litigation or general auditing
purposes. The policy must also make it clear that the employee has no
expectation of privacy with respect to communications on social network-
ing sites made through the employee's business account, on the em-
ployer's computer network, or on the employer's hardware, including
desktop computers, laptop computers, and mobile phones.284
In addition to implementing a detailed policy with respect to social
networking, employees who use the sites must be educated that the same
rules that apply with respect to business conversations and communica-
tions apply to the use of social networking in the workplace. Though
social networking users generally do not adhere to the rules of formality
associated with business communications, it is imperative that employees
are educated that communications for business purposes on social
networking sites should adhere to the same level of formality as e-mail
communications and other written communications for business pur-
poses. Thus, employees should be mindful of what they say on such sites
and should be educated that what they say could lead to liability, not only
for them but also for their employers. 285
Employers should also include in their policy the degree of privacy that
the employee account should maintain at a minimum.286 It is unlikely
that an employer would want their employees' profiles set to public so
that an Internet search would reveal information about the employer's
business contacts and clients. Depending on the nature of the informa-
tion and the business of the company, the employer must be explicit re-
garding what privacy settings the employees' profiles should maintain so
that the employers and employees are protected from the unwanted
viewing of business profiles on social networking sites. Also, the em-
ployer should require employees who want to modify their privacy set-
284. See, e.g., id.; Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
285. See IBM Social Computing Guidelines, supra note 275.
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tings to contact the employer for any modifications in deviation of the
employer's social networking policy.
By using a contract where the employee agrees to consent to disclosure
of the information in exchange for use of social networking sites at work
for business purposes, a company will be able to ensure that it has the
ability to access information so that it retains control of its employees'
reluctant actions on social networking sites. If a company decides to al-
low employees to communicate for business purposes on social network-
ing sites, it is imperative that the guidelines be clear with respect to what
the employees can and cannot say on the site, the employees' expecta-
tions of privacy regarding the communications, the employer's expecta-
tions of professionalism, and the penalties for failure to follow the
guidelines. 287 And once again, the policy should be enforced to have any
merit.
C. DATA RETENTION POLICIES AND LITIGATIONS HOLDS
From a discovery standpoint, employees' use of social networking for
business purposes will greatly increase the realm of discoverable informa-
tion that a company has to control, and as such, modifications to data
retention procedures must be made. If litigation is anticipated, a com-
pany and its counsel should issue a litigation hold that encompasses infor-
mation posted on social networking sites-no information should be
deleted from the employer's page, the employee's business pages, or
archives thereof. As mentioned in Zubulake, a litigation hold does not
end the counsel's duty of preservation. 288 The litigation hold with respect
to the information on social networking sites must be reissued periodi-
cally to make sure that employees are aware of their obligations. 289 In
addition, employers and counsel must request the information from social
networking sites or gain access to it from employees who likely have rele-
vant information and be particularly explicit with those employees' obli-
gations of preservation. 290 To save time, employers may also request that
employees locally archive their social networking site pages to ensure
that the data is not lost.2 9 1 There is a caveat with this approach-the
stronger the data retention policy, the more data there will be to mine in
the event of a discovery request. Companies should be mindful that a
policy should be implemented but should also be cautious that in the
event of litigation, spoliation does not occur that results in discovery
sanctions. Ultimately, companies should be educated about media their
employees are using to collaborate with each other, contact clients, con-
duct business, and should work with their IT groups to formulate reten-
287. See IBM Social Computing Guidelines, supra note 275.
288. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
289. See id. at 433.
290. See id.
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tion and archiving policies that are suited for their specific business
needs.
V. CONCLUSION
Though social networking sites are great marketing tools for compa-
nies, their use in the workplace must be guided by specific guidelines to
protect employers and their employees from liability. Companies must
take into consideration their ability to obtain the information in the event
that it is needed for discovery purposes and revise their computer usage
and data retention policies to account for these needs. There is no
cookie-cutter policy that applies to all employers and companies; a com-
pany must create a policy to meet the customized needs of its business.
Social networking is now the norm, and it is time for employers to recog-
nize that their use in the workplace is happening, whether or not it is
specifically condoned or guided by policy. Before companies post links
on their websites to find them on Facebook or follow them on Twitter,
they should consider the legal implications of such solicitations and en-
sure that they have adequate policies in place so that they are well pre-
pared in the event of litigation.
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